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Subcontracting and Union-Management
Legal and Contractual Relations
Russell A. Smith
The practice of subcontracting certain types of work is often a
source of serious disagreement between an employer and his employees.

The already-complex problems in this area are magnified by the existence of dual forums for the settlement of subcontracting disputes judicida or quasi-judicial resolution in those cases involving provisions

of the National Labor Relations Act and arbitrationin situations arising
under contractual agreements. Professor Smith discusses the ramifications of "contracting out" in both of these contexts. Utilizing surveys

of arbitrationcases to support his findings, he concludes that those factors which are often determinative of statutory subcontracting issues

are frequently relied upon by arbitrators to interpret contracts which
either have express subcontracting provisions or are silent on the subject.

T HE TERM "subcontracting" in the industrial relations vernacular has a special meaning. It has reference not to subcontracting in a technical, legal sense, but rather to any arrangement made
by an employer to have performed or supplied by an independent
contractor some service or product which the employer has
TE AUTHOR (A.B., Grinnell College,
J.D., University of Michigan) is a Propreviously provided or professor of Law at the University of Michiduced as a part of his business
gan.
operation either wholly or partially through the use of his
own union-represented employees. A more accurate term would
be "contracting out." An example of a service subcontract would
be an arrangement calling for the performance of janitorial work
inside the employer's plant by the outside contractor. An example
of a product subcontract would be a contract to purchase a component part or a machine tool to be used in a manufacturing process.
As seen by the employees of the employer who has entered into the
subcontract, the significant labor relations aspect, common to each,
is the withdrawal from employees of the work involved in performing the service or producing the component or tool.
A business fact to be kept in mind, of course, is that what is
contracting out to one employer is contracting in to another, and the
same employer is frequently involved both in contracting out and
contracting in. This is likely to be the case especially in the purchase and sale of product components. Here is involved the very
common business problem of "make or buy." It may be that, in the
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long run, the particular employer's employees, and employees generally, gain more employment and earnings opportunities than they
lose by free subcontracting of this kind. However, the contracting
out of an in-plant service is less easily rationalized in terms of employee interests.
By the same token what is a loss of jobs and earnings opportunities, and a shrinkage pro tanto of one bargaining unit because of
a particular instance of subcontracting by the employer-subcontractor, represents a corresponding gain to the bargaining unit of another subcontractor, if the latter is organized. So it is not by any
means clear that the interests of unionism as a whole are prejudiced
in any fundamental sense by freedom of restriction on the right to
subcontract.
i

THE LAW OF THE

STATUTE: THE

DUTY TO BARGAIN

Subcontracting nevertheless may have actual or potential adverse effects on employees and the union representing them in particular instances. This obviously is the basis for the conclusion that
the subject is encompassed by the phrase "terms and conditions of
employment" as used in section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 1 and therefore is a statutory subject of collective
bargaining, classifiable within the "mandatory" area as that term
has been defined in the administration of the act.2 This is easy to
see when the bargaining proposal relates to the contracting out of
kinds of services which have been performed by bargaining unit
employees as in the celebrated case of FibreboardPaper Prods.Corp.
v. NLRB.' The result is less plausible, although perhaps analyti'As

amended, 61 Star. 142 (1947),
The leading case establishing the
v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.,
ING, PUBLIc POLICY AND COLLECTIVE
mers ed. 1962); Cox, Labor Decisions
2

29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
"mandatory-permissive" dichotomy is NLRB
356 U.S. 342 (1958). See generally FLEMBARGAINING 67-70 (Shister, Aaron & Sumof the Supreme Court at the October Term,

1957, 44 VA. L. RRV. 1057, 1074-86 (1958); Note, Subcontracting, Mandatory Col-

lective Bargaining, and the 1965 NLRB Decisions, 18 STAN. L. REV. 256 (1965).
See also Gasko, Subcontracting: The Labor Management Relations Act and the Warrior Doctrine: A Lateral Analysis, 41 U. DET. LJ. 1 (1 963); Note, Employer Subcontractingand the LMRA, 13 RUTGERs L. REV. 702 (1959).
8379 U.S. 203 (1964). In this case the employer had for some years had col-

lective bargaining relations with a Local of the United Steelworkers for a bargaining
unit of the company's maintenance employees. After the union had initiated collective bargaining on the agreement to supplant, upon its terminal date, the parties'
then current agreement, the company notified the union it had decided to contract
out all maintenance work, so that "negotiation of a new contract would be pointless."
There was evidence that cost savings was the prime motivating factor underlying the
decision. After some preliminary discussions with the union, which were concluded
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cally indistinguishable, when the proposal encompasses a managerial
decision to purchase rather than manufacture a product component
or a machine tool. As the Supreme Court in deciding Fibreboard
carefully noted: "Our decision need not and does not encompass
other forms of 'contracting out' or 'sub-contracting' which arise
daily in our complex economy."4 An important question, therefore,
is how far the NLRB and the courts will extend the holding in
Fibreboard.
Whatever may be the scope of the duty to bargain concerning
subcontracting when the labor agreement is open for bargaining,
there is the further question of the existence and extent of the obligation during the term of an agreement which is "silent" on the
subject of subcontracting. The principles laid down in NLRB v.
Jacobs Mfg. Co.5 and related cases' presumably determine whether
either party is under a duty to bargain for an addition to the contract of some provision dealing specifically with the subject. But
whether the employer, insofar as section 8(a) (5) is concerned, is
free of any obligation to bargain with the union, upon demand,
before engaging in a particular act of subcontracting may be
with the understanding the parties would meet again on a set date to consider the
matter, the company entered into the contemplated subcontracting arrangement.
The union filed unfair labor practice charges against the company, alleging violations of §§ 8(a) (1), 8 (a) (3), and 8(a) (5). The Trial Examiner, after a hearing,
filed an Intermediate Report recommending dismissal of the complaint. The NLRB accepted this recommendation. 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961). Petitions for reconsideration were filed by the General Counsel and the union, which were granted. Upon
reconsideration, the Board accepted the Trial Examiner's finding that the company's
motivation in subcontracting was economic rather than anti-union, but held nevertheless that there had been a failure to negotiate, hence a § 8(a) (5) violation. 138
N.L.R.B. 550 (1962). Enforcement of the Board's order was granted by the Court
of Appeals 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963). A second petition for certiorari was
granted, 375 U.S. 963 (1964).
4 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215 (1964).
5 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cit. 1952), enforcing, 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951).
6 Some important and to some extent unresolved problems have emerged concerning, among other things, the materiality of the fact or lack of discussions of the subject
in the course of negotiating the last contract, and the effect of a so-called "waiver" or
"wrap-up" provision included in the collective bargaining agreement. This kind of
provision, which is quite common, purports to constitute a bilateral waiver of the
right of either party to demand bargaining, during the contract term, on any subject
whether or not discussed during contract negotiations. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
150 N.L.R.B. No. 136 (Feb. 5, 1965); Press Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 976 (1958); Beacon
Piece Dyeing & Furnishing Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 953 (1958); Speidel Corp., 120 N.L.R.B.
733 (1958).
See generally Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv.
L. REv. 1401 (1958); Cox & Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the
Term of an Existing Agreement, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1097 (1950); Duvin, The Duty
to Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 248 (1964); Seagle, The
Duty of an Employer to Bargain in Post Contract Negotiations, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 523
(1966); Wollett, The Duty to Bargain Over the "Unwritten" Terms and Conditions
of Employment, 36 TExAS L REv. 863 (1958).
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viewed as a different kind of problem both conceptually and in
practical significance. Is the employer now proposing or undertaking an act which, by virtue of its impact, so alters the factual
framework within which the contract was negotiated that he has,
in legal effect, waived a right, otherwise established, to refuse to
bargain during the contract term? Does the answer here require
a determination of whether the agreement, properly interpreted in
the light of such matters as past practice, collective bargaining history, and the inclusion of a "management rights" clause in the
contract, affirms the right of the employer to contract out, at least
within certain limits? If so, is this process of interpretation a matter for the NLRB, a court, or, if arbitration is provided for in the
contract, an arbitrator?
Decisions of the NLRB rendered since Fibreboardseem on the
whole to indicate a withdrawal from anything like a rigid position
on the statutory issue, especially where the question is raised in the
context of an existing collective bargaining agreement and the protest is against unilateral subcontracting without bargaining during
the term of the agreement! Nor does there emerge from the decisions a clear analytical or conceptual framework of decision.
Rather, the decisions seem to have been made on an ad hoc
basis, with emphasis upon the circumstances surrounding the managerial decision, including "past practice." There appears, indeed,
to be some resemblance in methodology, if not in concept, between this process of statutory application and that employed by
arbitrators in probing union challenges to subcontracting on the
basis of the existence of implicit contractual restrictions.'
7 For

applications of Firbeboard,however, as reappraised, see Standard Handker-

chief Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (Feb. 15, 1965); Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350

F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965), denying enforcement of 148 N.L.LB. No. 59 (Aug. 27,
1964).
8 It is interesting to note that even before the Supreme Court had decided Fibreboard, the NLRB had already started to reappraise its position. In a series of 1964
cases the Board refused to find § 8(a) (5) violations where there was a showing that
the subcontracting did not result in "significant detriment" to employment, job tenure
and/or security of unit employees, there was an established practice of subcontracting
without notice to or negotiation with the union, and the parties' collective bargaining
history indicated unsuccessful union attempts to obtain specific contractual limitations
on subcontracting. Kennecott Copper Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (Oct. 13, 1964);
General Motors Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (Oct. 30, 1964); Shell Oil Co., 149
N.L.R.B. No. 26 (Oct. 29, 1964).
In a series of 1965 decisions the following factor or factors, singly or in combination, were considered as sufficient to reject the claim of a § 8(a) (5) violation:
(1) lack of "significant impairment" of employment, job tenure, or security of unit
employees; (2) established past practice of subcontracting without notice to or negotiation with the union; (3) no difference in kind or degree between the protested
subcontracting and past subcontracting; (4) unsuccessful attempts by the union to ob-
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Arbitrators have tended on the whole, as will be noted, to find in
the "silent" labor agreement some kind of implied limitation on
managerial freedom to subcontract. If an analysis of the cases disdoses that arbitrators inquire into the same kinds of fact questions
which concern the NLRB when the union elects to proceed under
section 8 (a) (5), there would seem to be presented another of the
several problems of alternative forums which arise in the administration of the "law" of the statute and the "law" of the contract.' One
of the relevant questions, then, would be whether primacy as a matter of federal law or policy should attach to one or the other forum."0
Regardless of the manner in which this matter should be resolved, it seems to be clear at least that the NLRB, although presumably knowledgeable about the developing arbitral jurisprudence
tain contractual restrictions indicated by the parties' collective bargaining history; and
(5) silence of the agreement on subcontracting and/or presence of a broad "management rights" or "waiver" provision. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 33
(June 24, 1965) (factors 1, 2, and 4, including a disinclination to regard as persuasive the damage to employee recall rights because of their speculative nature); American Oil Co., 152 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (April 22, 1965) (factors 1 and 2); Central Soya
Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 161 (April 14, 1965) (factors 1 and 2, plus noting that the
amount of work involved was "minimal"); General Tube Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 89
(March 19, 1965) (factor 1); International Shoe Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 78 (March,
15, 1965) (factor 5); Allied Chem. Corp., 151 N.L.ILB. No. 76 (March 16, 1965)
(factor 1, 2, 3, and 4); American Oil Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 45 (March 3, 1965) (factors 1, 2, and 4); Fafnir Bearing Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (March 1, 1965) (factors 1,
2, 4, and 5); Superior Coach Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (Feb. 19, 1965) (factors 1, 2,
and 4); Ador Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 161 (Feb. 10, 1965) (factor 5); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 150 N.LR.B. No. 136 (Feb. 5, 1965) (factors 1, 2, and 4) in which the
Board opinion stated that "it is wrong to assume that, in the absence of an existing
contractual waiver, it is a per se unfair labor practice in all situations for an employer
to let unit work without consulting with the unit bargaining representative." Id. at 1258.
In this analysis the author was assisted by the outline notes prepared by William
S. Zeman, Esq., of Hartford, Connecticut, for his discussion of April 20, 1966, at
the Nineteenth Annual Conference on Labor, New York University.
9 See generally Smith & Jones, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law, 63 MIcH. L. REV. 751, 768-71, 795-97 (1965).
Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964), reversing 11 N.Y.2d 452,
230 N.Y.S.2d 703, 184 N.E.2d 298 (1962), seems to have gone far in the direction
of upholding arbitral jurisdiction (of a contract issue) despite the possible or actual
existence of statutory jurisdiction (in the NLRB) over a statutory issue arising out
of the same set of facts. But the Court has yet to rule on the question of primacy,
and the NLRB and lower courts have not come up with any dear answer.
10
See generally LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 839-46 (3d ed. 1965); McCULLOCH, Arbitration and/or NLRB in LABOR ARBITRATION AND INDusTRIAL
CHANGE, PROCEEDINGS

16TH ANN. MEETING, NAT'L AcADEMY OF ARBITRATORS

175-91 (1963); Christensen, Arbitration, Section 301, and the National Labor Relations Act, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 411 (1962); Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practice: Jurisdictional Problems, 57 COLUM. L REV. 52 (1957); Wollett, The Interpretation of Collective Bargaining Agreements: Who Should Have
Primary Jurisdiction,10 LAB. L.J. 477 (1959); Note, Jurisdictionof Arbitrators and
State Courts Over Conduct Constituting Both a Contract Violation and an Unfair
Labor Practice, 69 HARV. L. REv. 725 (1956).
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on the subject of implied contractual limitations on subcontracting,
has not elected to fit this substantive development logically into its
own jurisprudence on the in-contract term statutory bargaining obligation. If there is a contractual implied limitation on management,
one might suppose, applying Jacobs, there could be no in-term
section 8(a) (5) problem at all, but only a problem of contract administration. If the implied restriction were deemed to be relatively
unqualified and absolute, as was judicially determined in UAW v.
Webster Elec. Co., it would be absurd to regard the subject of subcontracting as still open for bargaining during the contract term.
Since, however, the implied restriction is generally considered to be
simply to refrain from acting in bad faith, the limitation upon management is presumably no more than would be true with respect to
the exercise of other reserved managerial rights and the Board could
consider as unrealistic the view that the subject of subcontracting
has been negotiated in the absence of an actual history of specific
negotiations.
In dosing this brief discussion of the statutory ramifications of
subcontracting, it is of interest to note that the mere fact of union
entitlement to recognition as statutory bargaining agent of employees in a defined unit does not give rise to an implicit absolute
statutory prohibition on employer acts, including subcontracting,
which in effect reduce the size or scope of the bargaining unit.
Neither the duty to bargain,nor the other obligations resting on the
employer under section 8 (a) create a statutory duty applicable under
all circumstances to keep intact the full dimensions of the unit as
originally defined.
H.

THE SILENT AGREEMENT: THE PROBLEM
OF IMPLIED LIMITATIONS

Unions have repeatedly sought to establish the proposition that
there arises out of the typical collective bargaining agreement, which
is silent on the subject, an implied restriction on subcontracting.
The argument is that the implication derives principally from the
"recognition" provision, and additionally from the provisions concerning a, union shop, seniority, wages, and practically all others
which establish working conditions in the shop for bargaining unit
employees. Typically, it has been argued that these provisions of
the agreement import what amounts to a guarantee by the employer
that the work encompassed by the defined bargaining unit will be
1299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1962).
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performed for the employer, if at all, by unit personnel. The rationale has sometimes been expressed as a simple application of the
interpretative process of inferring contractual intent by drawing necessary implications from express provisions. At times the proponents have referred generally to the "fruits of the bargain" or "good
faith" principle which is well established in contract law. 2
This attempt has been vigorously resisted by employers. They
have contended, of course, that the silent labor agreement may not
properly be construed to give rise to any kind of implied restriction
on subcontracting except, perhaps, the obligation to act in good
faith. However, employers assess the good faith concept quite differently than do the unions.'" Thus, they argue that the silent
agreement leaves the matter of subcontracting, like other business
decisions unrestricted by any specific provision in the agreement,
within the area of managerial discretion so long as the exercise of
this discretion is not motivated by anti-union considerations. Employers maintain that the union analysis is basically faulty, particularly in its reliance on the recognition clause of the agreement
which, at most, simply imports into the contract the statutory concept of recognition, which does not at all involve work jurisdiction
or an implied restriction on the power to make the decision.
Some courts and arbitrators have sustained the union analysis.
At the other extreme, some have rejected this approach and have
held that under the typical labor agreement, management is totally
or substantially unrestricted in its right to subcontract. The great
weight of decisional authority, however, and certainly the trend in
recent years, adheres to a position somewhere between these two
extremes. 4 Management is said to be subject to implied restrictions
12 "Williston tells us that there is also in every contract 'an implied covenant that
neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring
the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract; in other words, in
every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Cox,
The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1, 17
(1958), citing, 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 670, at 159 (Jaeger ed. 1961). See
Shulman, Reason, Contract,and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv. 999, 1012

(1955).
13 For an interesting evaluation of the applicability of this concept as a basis for
deriving implied limitations upon management, see KELLER, THE MANAGEMENT
FuNcTiON: A PosiTrv APPROACH TO LABOR RELATIONS 61-66 (1963).
14See generally ELKOuIr & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (1960);
Greenbaum, The Arbitration of Subcontracting Disputes: An Addendum, 16 wIN.
& LAB. RIEL. REV. 221 (1963); Seagle, supra note 6; Note, Arbitration of Subcontracting Disputes: Management Discretion vs. Job Security, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 523
(1962); Note, Management PrerogativesNo Longer Include Right to Make Unilateral
Decision to Subcontract, 38 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 288 (1963); 60 MICH. L. REV. 1173

(1962).

See also

CORNELL UNIVERSTY, CONFmNCE ON: THE ARBITRATION OF
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which, however, are not absolute and leave to management a considerable amount of discretion. The major problem emerging from
the cases so holding, particularly from the arbitration decisions, concerns the very great difficulty of attempting to discern from them
anything resembling a consensus with respect either to conceptual
analysis or to the kinds of fact situations which will provide a basis
for confident or reliable prediction that a grievance protesting subcontracting will be sustained or denied.
Arbitrators from time to time have given their own testimony to
this effect. Arbitrator G. Allan Dash in his much cited "arbitrability" decision in Celanese Corp. of America3 5 stated:
I conclude from my analysis of the 64 published arbitration awards
... that the majority of arbitrators who have been called upon to
rule on a contracting-out grievance arising under an agreement
in which there is no express language prohibiting contracting-out
have construed the language of the agreement before them as a
whole and have attempted, with confinement of their attention to
the specific case, to make certain that the Company's action of contracting-out particular work at a specific time has not had the effect of violating other recorded agreements provisions as interpreted and
applied by the parties themselves through their past
6
practice.'
'Two

"MANAGEMENT RIGHTS" IsSUES: WORK ASSIGNMENT AND CONTRACTING OUT

(1960).
15 33 Lab. AMb. 925 (1959) (Dash, Arbitrator).
16 Celanese Corp. of America, 33 Lab. Arb. 925, 944-45 (1959) (Dash, Arbitrator). Another example occurred in the 1958 case of Bethlehem Steel Co., 30 Lab. Arb.
678 (1958) where Arbitrator Ralph Seward stated:
Because of the importance which they attach to the issue, both parties have
cited certain decisions of other arbitrators in support of their position, and
the Umpire has supplemented these citations by his own research into the
reported cases. Beyond revealing that other companies and unions have
faced this same question of implied obligations - have presented similar
agreements, and voiced similar fears - the cases show little uniformity of
either theoretical agreement or ultimate decision ....

Within each group

of decisions, moreover, there are conflicts of principle and approach. The
Umpire has returned from his exploration of the cases a sadder - if not a
wiser - man, echoing the plaint of Omar Khayyam: "Myself when young
did eagerly frequent Doctor and Saint and heard great argument about it
and about: but evermore came out by that same door where in I went" Id.
at 682.
Similarly, the present writer in a 1962 decision stated:
Both parties in their briefs make extensive references to the decisions of
other arbitrators in the area of subcontracting. Such citation is understandable, since it is literally possible to cite prior decisions which range throughout the entire spectrum of possibilities.... The Referee has examined (more
than once) the reported cases, as have others. His distinct impression is that
in most instances, at least in recent years, the result in the particular case
was to uphold the employer's right to take the protested action, while the
opinion indicated the view that there are limitations based on factors not
presented by the facts of the particular case.... Sometimes a detailed cata-
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Arbitrator Donald A. Crawford has stated: "Having decided that the
issue is arbitrable, we arbitrators then proceed to fog the issue up."17
If there is so much difficulty among arbitrators in identifying controlling considerations, and even greater difficulty on the part of
non-arbitrators in trying to ferret out from arbitration decisions
meaningful rationales or bases for prediction, it is tempting to
speculate that the reason must lie in a failure to achieve an adequate
conceptual analysis of the problem. On the other hand, the fact
may simply be that arbitrators, unwilling to accept the extreme positions of either side, are attempting with more or less sensitivity to
react sensibly to all the facts presented. In a very recent case Arbitrator Samuel S. Kates stated:
In my opinion, in line with the trend of arbitrational decisions,
each case should be decided upon its own facts in the light of the
applicable labor agreement, rather than entirely or mainly upon the
mere presence or absence in the labor agreement of an express
reference to the contracting out of work. 8
In this "groping" process a suitable and helpful conceptual analysis
may ultimately evolve.
A.

Recent Surveys of Arbitration
Decisions on Subcontracting

There have been published two extensive and elaborate statistical
and analytical dissections of arbitration decisions on subcontracting.
The first was undertaken by Arbitrator Dash in the Celanese case,' 9
in which the issue presented to him was whether a grievance protesting subcontracting under a silent agreement was arbitrable."
His survey, covering the period from approximately mid-1947 to
mid-1959, was commented upon by Arbitrator Crawford before the
log of such prohibited types or circumstances of subcontracting was set forth,
by way of dicta; the more usual pattern has been to express the limitation in
terms of such broad criteria as a necessity of "good faith," or "fair dealing,"
or the requisite of "sound business judgment," or the absence of evidence
that the action "arbitrarily reduced the scope of the bargaining unit." In
most instances, the arbitrator stressed the importance of looking dosely at "the
facts and circumstances" of the case, and these, of course, have been almost
infinitely varied. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 1213, 1217-18
(1962) (Smith, Arbitrator).
17 CRAWFORD, The Arbitration of Disputes Over Subcontracting, in CHALLENGES
TO ARBITRATION 55 (1961).
18W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 444, 447 (1966) (Kates, Arbitrator).
19 33 Lab. Arb. 925 (1959) (Dash, Arbitrator).
20 Ibid. See also his later analysis, Dash, The Arbitration of Subcontracting Disputes, 16 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 208 (1963).
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Marcia Greenbaum in 1963
National Academy of Arbitrators.'
published an extension of the kind of study made by Dash but covering the period from approximately mid-1959 to mid-1962.22 These
interesting analyses seemed to be of sufficient merit to warrant
bringing them up to date with respect to published and certain unpublished decisions covering the period September 1962 to approximately mid-April 1966. The results of these surveys are contained
in Tables I-II.'
The Dash and Greenbaum studies also included a review of judicial decisions in subcontracting cases involving silent labor agreement. In the vast majority of cases the issue presented to the court
concerned the arbitrability of the grievance protesting the subcontracting, rather than the merits. Dash stated:
My study of the court cases cited by the Company, plus numerous others I have been able to locate, convinces me that the large majority of courts that have ruled on the issue of arbitrability of contracting-out issues in connection with agreements containing no express language prohibiting such action have, and will, rule such issues
to be nonarbitrable. 4
Similarly, Greenbaum stated:
The courts up until the Supreme Court decision in the Warrior
& Gulf case seem to have wavered back and forth deciding for and
against arbitrability. Since this decision, with the exception of one
case, they have joined the arbitrators in ruling in favor of arbitrability.2 5
This writer's review of court cases decided since mid-1962 confirms
the trend noted by Greenbaum. The Supreme Court's decisions in
the "1960 Trilogy"2" have generally been held to'be conclusive on
the issue of arbitrability so far as the courts are concerned. 7
21

CRAWFORD, op. cit. supra note 17.
22Greenbaum, supra note 14.
23 This work was undertaken for the author by a research assistant, Sidney Frank,
a member of the senior class at the Michigan Law School. I wish to express my indebtedness to him for his valuable assistance in the preparation of the Tables and the
classification of the cases therein.
24Celanese Corp. of America, 33 Lab. Arb. 925, 944 (1959) (Dash, Arbitrator).
25
Greenbaum, supra note 14, at 222.
2
6United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), reversing
264 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1959); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960), reversing 269 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959); United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), reversing in pat 269 F.2d
327 (4th Cir. 1959).
27Se Smith & Jones, sfsra note 9, at 784-88; Smith & Jones, The Impact of the
Emerging Federal Law of Grievance Arbitration on Judges, Arbitrators, and Parties,
52 VA. L. Rv. 831 (1966).
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An Analysis of the Surveys

Arbitrators, of course, frequently are confronted with the issue
of arbitrability as a threshold question. Dash's study indicates that
of the 64 decisions reported, there were 10 in which the arbitrator
had to rule on this question, and that in each instance the claim of
non-arbitrability was rejected. Of the 50 cases reviewed by Greenbaum, there were again 10 in which the question of arbitrability had
to be determined, and again the ruling was in support of arbitrability in all 10. Of the 78 decisions covered in the present survey, it
is interesting to note that the question of arbitrability had to be ruled
upon in only 5 cases or slightly over 5 per cent, as contrasted with
20 per cent in the Greenbaum survey cases and 15 percent in the
Dash survey cases. In only 1 of the 5 cases of the present study did
the arbitrator find the grievance non-arbitrable.28
It seems fairly dear, therefore, that if the cases surveyed are a
fair sample of the total of unpublished as well as published decisions, the arbitrability issue has noticeably declined in importance.
One may fairly infer that this has been due at least in part to the impact of the Supreme Court's 1960 Trilogy cases2" in which the
Court, in defining the role of the court vis-a-vis that of the arbitrator
with respect to labor agreements containing broad arbitration provisions, rejected categorically the proposition that a claim of nonarbitrability should be entertained where, to decide the matter, it
would be necessary, in effect, to decide the underlying merits."
While this was a rule laid down for courts, not arbitrators, one may
also infer that one result has been to reduce the number of claims of
non-arbitrability made to arbitrators in subcontracting cases, and
that another result has been to influence arbitrators to reject such
claims when presented. 1
Certain other gross statistical comparisons are interesting. The
three surveys show the following results in terms of numbers of
cases in which the grievance protesting subcontracting was sustained: Dash survey, 19 of 62 cases, or 30 per cent; Greenbaum
survey, 11 of 50 cases, or 22 per cent; the author's survey, 12 of
77 cases, or about 16 per cent. These data seem to indicate that
28

Rockwell-Standard Corp., unpublished, (D. P. Miller, Arbitrator).

29 United

Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
30 See Smith & Jones, supra note 27; Smith & Jones supra note 9.
31 ibid.
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TABLE I
RIGHT TO CONTRACT OUT RETAINED
WITH OR WITHOUT LIMITED QUALIFICATIONS
Company Name

Armour and Co.
Continental Can Co.
Franklin Ass'n

Rohm & Haas Co.
Sheller Mfg. Co.
Latrobe Steel Co.
Remington Rand
Remington Rand
E. J. Laving & Co.
Singer Co.
Sandvik Steel Co.

*Mobil Oil Co.

*General Aniline and Film
Corp.
*Con-Gas Service Corp.
*Lmde Co.
*Printing Indus., Inc.
*American Oil Co.
*Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.
*Alan Wood Steel Co.

Citation

Arbirator

UnpubL
UnpubL
45 Lab. Arb.
43 Lab. Arb.
42 ab. Arb.
42 Lab. Arb.
39 Lab. Arb.
39 Lab. Arb.
46 Lab. Arb.
45 Lab. Arb.
45 Lab. Arb.

JS. Williams
829 (1965)
(1964)
(1963)
(1964)
(1962)
(1962)
(1966)

333
854
921
552
552
98
840
1061

(1965)

(1966)

UnpubL
UnpubL
43 Lab. Arb.
43 Lab. Arb.
42 Lab. Arb.
41 Lab. Arb.
39 Lab. Arb.
44 Lab. Arb.

91
554
586
342
1213
722

(1964)
(1964)
(1964)
(1963)
(1962)
(1965)

D. W. Whiting

J.D.Larlan

J. Brundscham
F. IL Uible
D. E. Whiting

L B. Scheiber
L B. Scheiber
W. Boles
S. Caha
L Kertison

Added Sai

2,4
2, 4

1,,2, 13
1,2,4,5
2, 3,4
2, 4 5,12,'
1,2,3,5, 1
1,2,3,12,
1,2, 5

3,12
1, 5

G. G. Somers

1, 2,3,5, 1'

D. E. Whiting
M. E. Nichols
J. W. Murphy
. Feinberg
P. M Kelliher
R. Smith
R. Valtm

12, 13
3,5,13
1,2
1, 2, 3, 4, 1
1,4,5,13
1,2,4,5, 1

1,2

* Cases may possibly belong in Table If.
t Grievance denied on merits.
No.
Qadifiatsons or Added Support
1. Act was in good faith, or not in bad fat.
2. Act was dictated by requirements of the business, for efficiency, for economy,
or for expeditious performance.
3. Act was in conformance with past practices, not previously objected to by the
union.

4. Act was not unreasonable arbitrary, discriminatory, nor intended to harm status
of union.
5. Act did not cause substantial number of employees to be deprived of work.
**12. History of bargaining relationship and negotiations indicate that union recognizes that employer has right to subcontract and has failed to limit this right.
*"*13. Union claims in stating its position that employer violated recognition, seniority, wage, etc. provision of the agreement.
Factors 6-11 (as denominated in Table I) were not relied upon in the cases in Table L
*This factor was not used in the Dash analysis. It was added because some arbitrators thought
**

it just as important as any other and, in some cases, controlling.
This factor was not used in the Dash analysis. It was simply an attempt to indicate cases m
which the union sought to rely on a pure implied limitarions theory.
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TABLE I1
FLL RIGHT TO CONTRACT OUT NOT RETAINED
Company Name

Citation

Arbitrator

Borg-Warner Corp.
Mohawk Rubber Co.
Narragansett Brewing Co.
North Am. Aviation, Inc.
tRockweli-Standard Corp.
tRockwell-Standard Corp.
Palmer-Bee Co.

UnpubL
Unpubl.
UnpubL
Unpubl.
UnpubiUnpubl
UnpubL

J. F. Sullivan
J. G. Stashower
J- J. Healy

Rolway Bearing Co.
Bearings Co.
Richardson Co.
Purex Corp.
$Bridgeport Brass Co.

Unpubl.
Unpubl.
45 Lab. Arb. 451 (1965)
45 Lab Arb. 174 (1965)
90 (1965)
45 Lab. Arb.

R. E.Kharas
R. W. Purr

tBridgeporr Brass Co.

45 Lab. Arb.

Millprint, Inc.
Wright Mach. Co.
Phillips Chem. Corp.
Kaiser Steel Corp.
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp.
$United States Steel Corp.
+United States Steel Corp.
Pacific Laundry & Dry
Cleaning Co.
Trans World Airlines
Collins Radio Co.
Crompton & Knowles Corp.
Union Carbide Metals Co.
Griffin Pipe Prods. Co.
KVP Sutherland Paper Co.
Dow Metal Prods. Co.
Station KQED
Celotex Corp.
Electric Autolite Co.
Weatherhead Co.
Anaconda Am. Brass Co.
Bendix Corp.
National Airlines, Inc.
United States Steel Corp.

44
44
44
44
39
39
39

Lab.
Lab.
Lab.
Lab.
Lab.
Lab.
Lab.

39
39
39
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
41
41
41
41
41

Lab. Arb.
Lab. Arb.
Lab. Arb.
Lab. Arb.
Lab. Arb.
Lab. Ab.
Lab. Arb.
Lab. Arb.
Lab. Arb.
Lab. Arb.
Lab. Arb.
Lab. Arb.
Lab. Arb.
Lab. Arb.
Lab. Arb.
Lab. Arb.

Waterman-Bic Pea Corp.
Simplex Wire & Cable Co.
Convey-All Corp.
Safeway Stores, Inc.
Twin City Milk Producers
Ass'n
Columbus Auto Parts Co.
$Pittsburgh Steel Co.
$Pittsburgh Steel Co.
Crompton & Knowles Corp.
tDiebold, Inc.
IDiebold, Inc.
Pittsburgh Steel Co.
Ford Motor Co.

A. M. Ross
D. P. Miller
D. P. Miller
D. P. Miller

Arb.
Atb.
Arb.
Arb.
Ab.
Arb.
Arb.

90 (1965)
678
641
102
25
1048
1089
1089

(1965)
(1965)
(1965)
(1965)
(1962)
(1963)
(1963)

676 (1962)
64 (1962)
180 (1962)
1332 (1963)
1193 (1963)
946 (1963)
737 (1963)
827 (1963)
638 (1963)
554 (1963)
429 (1963)
1333 (1963)
1236 (1964)
905 (1963)
765 (1963)
777 (1963)

41 Lab. Arb. 577 (1963)
41 Lab. Arb. 237 (1962)
41 Lab. Arb, 169 (1963)
42 Lab. Arb. 353 (1964)
42
42
42
42
42
42
42
42
42
A,

Lab.
Lab.
Lab.
Lab.
Lab.
Lab.
Lab.
Lab.
Lab.
T -L

Atb. 1121
Arb. 755
Mb. 750
Arb. 750
Arb. 594
Arb. 537
Arb. 537
Arb. 507
Arb 220
A ..

1 1

Q

A. Lanna
L Guild
Coam. State Bd.
of Med. & Arb.
Conn. State Bd.
of Med. & Arb.
A. Anderson
F.Flannagan
A. Sarrain
I. Bernstein

J. Altieri

S. Garrett
S. Garrett
T. Tsukiyama

J. Gilden

R. Ray
F. Sander
C. Duff

J. Larkin

S.Kadish

J. Sembower
A. Koven
P. Kelliher
H. Gole

E. J. Forsythe
B. Turkus
C A. Warns

j. C Vadakin
P. Florey appr.
by S. Garrett
Conn. Sr. Bd. of
Med. & Arb.
S. Wallen
S. Kates
A. M. Ross

(1964)

N. Gundermann
W. G Seinsheimer

(1964)

T. J. McDermott
T. J. McDermott

(1964)

(1964)
(1963)
(1964)

(1964)
(1964)
(1964)
10(IOA

A. H. Stockman

J. A. Klein
3. A. Klein
T. J. McDermott
H. H. Platt
T" T)-wnrln

No.

Emphass

1. Act must be in good faith, or not an effort to suppress terms of the agreement.
2. Act must be dictated by requirements of the business, for efficiency, for economy, or for expeditious perfomance.
3. Act must be in conformance with past practice not previously objected to by
union, must not be instituted by company as a new practice.
4. Act must not be unreasonable, arbitrary, discnminatory, not intended to harm,
prejudice, or undermine union.
5. Act must not be intended to, nor actually deprive substantial number of employees covered by the agreement of work in categories covered by agreement.
6. Act is barred by recognition provision (11) or would be barred if it had such
effect (5).
7 Act is barred by job security rights of employees including seniority.
8. Act is barred by wage provisions of the agreement.
9. Act is barred as a depnvation of overtime benefits.
10. Act is barred as a denial of rights of promotion, transfer or avoidance of layoff,
or results in improper discharge.
11. Act would be barred if it represents an attempt to evade substantial provisions
of the agreement, would make a nullity of agreement, or would be in violation of the "spiri, intent, or purpose' of the agreement.
**12. History of bargaining relationship and negotiations indicate that the union recognizes that the employer has right to subcontract and has failed to limit

this right.

***13. Union claims in stating its position that the employer violated recognition,
seniority, wage etc. provision of the agreement.
****14. Caim that the obligation to bargain imposed by virtue of the Fibreboarddecision has been violated.
* Tis factor was not used in the Dash analysis. It was added because some arbitrators thought
it just as important as any other and, in some cases, controlling.
This factor was not used in the Dash analysm It was simply an attempt to indicate cases in
which the union sought to rely on a pure implied limitations theory.
This factor was not used by Dash. It was used simply to indicate that the Supreme Court's
Fibreboarddecision became involved in the case.
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there has been no abatement, and indeed an increasing tendency,
on the part of unions to carry grievances protesting subcontracting
to arbitration. At the same time the unions faced a diminishing
prospect of success.
Speculation as to the reasons for these trends is probably unreliable partly because of a lack of knowledge of some relevant
facts. The increase in resort to arbitration could be reflective of
an increased incidence of subcontracting disputes, and hence of the
practice of subcontracting, or only (or at least in part) of the increasing tendency on the part of unions to attempt to obtain through
arbitration what they were unable or did not seek to obtain through
contract negotiations. The data on the won-loss record suggests the
possibility that arbitrators are tending to be less. receptive to union
protests against subcontracting. But another possibility is that
management has tended increasingly to avoid subcontracting in situations where, insofar as it can judge from the arbitration precedent,
there exists a serious risk of losing a case.
The Dash analysis of the decisions sought to classify them according to whether the arbitrator seemed to accept the view that,
absent an express contract limitation, the right to subcontract was
either "retained" or "not retained" (Tables I and II, respectively)
Apparently this dichotomy was based in part on the premise that
there may be a basic difference in approach taken by arbitrators on
the relevance and applicability, in relation to the subcontracting
issue, of the "reserved rights" or "management functions" theory
of the collective bargaining agreement. It may be that this is an
untenable basis of classification, having more regard for certain
statements concerning management's reserved rights, or the absence
of them, in the arbitrator's opinion than may be justified. As Dash
himself recognized in a subsequent review of his own earlier work:
Table I shows nineteen published decisions in which the arbitrators seemed to sustain the reserved rights theory in deciding the
merits of the cases before them. They at least mention the theory
in some fashion. But to differentate between these nineteen decisions and the forty-five decisions in Table 2, in which the arbitrators found that the full right to subcontract work is not retained is
quite a difficult task. This is so because after many of the arbitrators in the nineteen cases had expressed the reserved rights
theory in some form they proceeded to abandon it in their written
opinions. The way in which they limited the applications of this
theory is recorded in the footnotes to Table 1 that are tied to the
heading of "Qualifications or Added Support." In other words
these arbitrators made use of the reserved rights theory but also
found the reasons recorded in these footnotes as additional support
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for their findings or as added criteria which the company had to
32
meet.

Crawford, analyzing the cases surveyed by Dash, concluded that
"only a minority of arbitrators even recite the reserved rights theory,
and very often abandon it on utterance." 8 Despairing of finding
meaningful 'articulations of doctrine in the decisions, he turned to
"the factual decisions made," and, through this approach, found
that "the fog" was somewhat dissipated and that "a pattern of consistent decision-making - however inconsistently articulated emerged."3 4 Greenbaum also noted the difficulty of attempting to
differentiate between the two categories of cases, stating:
Although the arbitrators in Table 1 cases [referring to her sur-

vey] mentioned management's reserved rights they did not adhere

to a strict interpretation of that theory but instead added or "implied" some limitations.3 5
The most significant point, perhaps, is that in every instance
involving a case classified in any of the three studies in Table I,
it was deemed necessary to note that the opinion of the arbitrator,
although professing to embrace the reserved rights theory in general, proceeded beyond that point. Each arbitrator additionally
listed one or more conclusions of fact in relation to the circumstances surrounding the act of subcontracting which fact apparently, in the arbitrator's view, constituted at least make-weight support of the conclusion on the merits; in every instance this conclusion was to deny the grievance.
In attempting to decide which cases fell into the Table I category, it was quickly discovered that arbitrators seldom explicidy
indicate the relative importance of the facts or considerations cited
in their opinions. This difficulty reached the point that Table I
actually includes two sub-groups. Above the line are listed those
cases in which the arbitrator seemed to be resting his decision primarily on the management rights theory, any other factors mentioned having been regarded only as of rather incidental interest.
In the cases listed below the line it was less dear that the arbitrator
relied basically on a reserved rights approach, and the result was to
leave the analyst in real doubt as to whether the arbitrator would
have held as he did except for the existence of the other factors cited.
2Dash, supra note 20, at 211.
33 CRAWFORD,
3

op. cit. supra note 17, at 59.
cit. supra note 17, at 67.

4 CRAWFORD, op.

35

Greenbaum, sapra note 14, at 226.
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In none of the cases included in Table I did the arbitrator state
categorically that an employer may subcontract in his complete discretion and without limitation. In most instances the arbitrator
noted that the protested act of subcontracting had been made in
good faith or that the act was dictated by the requirements of the
business or was motivated by a desire to achieve efficiency, economy,
or more expeditious performance, or that there was consistency with
past practice (which is perhaps simply spelling out the concept of
good faith more completely).
It is probably no longer useful to attempt the classification system represented by Tables I and H. The first five factors of "qualifications or added support" listed in Table I are, to all intents and
purposes, the same as the first five factors listed as having been
emphasized in many of the cases listed in Table II. Considering the
cases listed in both tables on a consolidated basis, the specification
of the standard of good faith, or the more explicit proposition that
the fact of subcontracting must have been (or was) dictated by the
requirements of the business, or on grounds of efficiency, economy,
or expeditious performance, were the most commonly cited qualifying factors, having been mentioned in 42 and 47, respectively, of
the 77 cases. This follows the pattern noted earlier in the Dash
and Greenbaum surveys.
Even these criteria, however, are of little assistance as a basis
for forecasting results in future cases except where a further examination of the cases is made for the purpose of attempting to discern
the particular facts which influenced the decisions. Greenbaum,
after examining the original Dash survey, the Crawford explication of Dash, and Greenbaum's own survey, stated the following:
This writer from the vantage point of both studies concludes
that arbitrators will decide an employer may contract out as a man-

agement function where there is no express provision in an agreement prohibiting such action provided the employer has made a
reasonable business decision in good faith without intent to undermine the union. There is no queston that limitations are recognized by arbitrators. The matter boils down to how arbitrators
interpret the phrases "a reasonable business decision," "good faith,"
and "intent to undermine." ... The reasoning and logic of the decisions vary with the facts of the case, the clauses in the contract
which might be found applicable and their use by the parties and
the arbitrators' interpretations of those frequently used but difficult

to define phrases. 8

80 Greenbaum, supra note 14, at 234.
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Criteria Influencing Arbitrators of Subcontracting Disputes

(1) Cost Considerations. - One of the interesting problems
emerging from the cases is the relevance, in terms of the criterion
of good faith or its equivalent, of the fact that the employer's decision to subcontract was motivated wholly or substantially by considerations of cost, that is, that it costs less to get the work done
by an outside contractor than through one's own employees. The
further question arises whether it is pertinent to determine why
the outside contractor can do the work at less cost. One obvious
reason might be lower wage rates paid by the outside contractor,
possibly because his employees are non-union. This kind of case
had arisen frequently enough so that Crawford stated, as one
of his propositions emerging from an analysis of the facts of the
cases rather than their dicta:
3. The company cannot avoid the contract - cannot undermine (even unwittingly) the union by placing the union in the
impossible situation of having to agree to cut contract wage rates in
order to prevent the company from contracting the work our.
For the great preponderance of awards sustaining the union
were in situations where the only apparent or stated economy of
operations possible to the subcontractor were lower wagem rates the janitor, commission house, and overtime type casesY
On this point Greenbaum's conclusion, based upon her survey,
was that the factor appeared in so few cases as to preclude generalization. She found that the point had been mentioned in only
four decisions (as compared with twelve in the Dash survey), and
that, surprisingly enough, two arbitrators thought the managerial
decision was perfectly legitimate while the other two considered that
the ground of decision indicated an intent to undermine the union
and therefore was evidence of bad faith.a
This author's survey does not clarify the confusion. In five
cases it was stated or implied that subcontracting cannot be justified
solely by cost considerations.
In a few cases the saving of costs
seemed to be regarded as a make-weight factor in support of the

cit. supra note 17, at 68.
38 Greenbaum, supra note 14, at 231.
59
Bendix Corp., 41 Lab. Arb. 905 (1963) (Warns, Arbitrator); Crompton &
Knowles Corp., 40 Lab. Arb. 1333 (1963) (Sander, Arbitrator); KVP Sutherland
Paper Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 737 (1963) (Kadish, Arbitrator); Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp.,
39 Lab. Arb. 1048 (1962) (Altieri, Arbitrator); Simplex Wire & Cable Co., 41 Lab.
Arb. 237 (1962) (Wallen, Arbitrator).
a7 CRAWFORD, op.
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managerial decision.4" There may be an emerging view, although
still not widely held, that cost savings are sufficient to justify subcontracting, or at least that this consideration is not alone an index
of bad faith. However, in most instances the arbitrator has cited
other supporting factors as well in concluding that the managerial
decision was made for appropriate business reasons and hence was
not violative of the contract.4 1
(2) Good Faith. - The difficulty of evaluating the relevance
of cost considerations as a factor is illustrative of the problem encountered in attempting, conceptually and factually, to apply the
criterion of good faith. Arbitrators seldom expound at length on
any basic rationale or principle in their decisions. Those who are
lawyers (and some who are not) sometimes refer to the concept of
good faith which is said to be part of basic contract law. Others
express this idea more graphically as a "fruits of the bargain" notion. But the applicability of these principles to the labor agreement in relation to subcontracting problems is assumed, not explained. Perhaps this is attributable to the general, although by no
means universal, disposition of arbitrators to be pragmatists and to
react to facts rather than to indulge in juridical or labor relations
expositions. They tend to utilize other kinds of generalizations
which, however, are scarcely more precise.'
40

Kaiser Steel Corp., 44 Lab. Arb. 25 (1965) (Bernstein, Arbitrator); Arketex
Ceramic Corp., 43 ab. Arb. 1188 (1964) (Dworkin, Arbitrator); Safeway Stores,
Inc., 42 Lab. Arb. 353 (1964) (Ross, Arbitrator); Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 41 Lab.
Arb. 1236 (1964) (Turkus, Arbitrator).
41See Alan Wood Steel Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 722 (1965) (Valtin, Arbitrator);
Ametek, Inc., 43 Lab. Arb. 106 (1964) (Somers, Arbitrator); Printing Indus., Inc.,
42 Lab. Arb. 586 (1964) (Feinberg, Arbitrator); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 39 Lab.
Arb. 1213 (1962) (Smith, Arbitrator).
42 The following statements of arbitrators are illustrative of these generalizations:
There is no question in his [the arbitrator's) mind but that the Company
has - and has always had - a broad general right to contract with other
companies for the furnishing of goods and services. There is also no question but that it may not properly abuse that right - that it may not exercise
it in such a way as to frustrate the basic purposes of the Agreement or to
make the Agreement impossible to perform.... Bethlehem Steel Co., 30 Lab.
Arb. 678, 682 (1958) (Seward, Arbitrator).
In view of the fact that the Union has status as exclusive representative
of all encumbents of a given group of jobs, it would appear that recognition
of the Union plainly obligates the Company to refrain from arbitrarily or
unreasonably reducing the scope of the bargaining unit.
What is arbitrary or unreasonable in this regard is a practical question
which cannot be determined in a vacuum. The group of jobs which constitute a bargaining unit is not static and cannot be. Certain expansions, contractions, and modifications of the total number of jobs within the defined
bargaining unit are normal, expectable and essential to proper conduct of
the enterprise. Recognition of the Union for purposes of bargaining does
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In KVP Sutherland Paper Co., Arbitrator Kadish made an
interesting and valiant effort to find a suitable approach. After
not imply of itself any deviation from this generally recognized principle.
The question in this case, then, is simply whether the Company's action
. . . can be justified on the basis of all relevant evidence as a normal and
reasonable Management action in arranging for the conduct of work at the
Plant. National Tube Co., (Garrett, Arbitrator), published in II Basic Steel
Arbitration Information Bulletins 777, 779.
Consideration of the relevant materials which bear on the issue in these cases permits
these generalized answers to some of the questions raised in them:
First, in the exercise of its managerial authority under Article Fifteen,
Management has the right to have work done by outside contractors in the
conditions which reasonable men recognize as proper grounds for contracting
out work. This right has been exercised for years ... without serious Union
challenge....
Second, the Company may not abuse its right to let work to outside contractors. No one can deny that good faith and fair dealing are implied obligations under a labor agreement. If these obligations are to be meaningful,
Management, in contracting out work, must act reasonably and with conscious
attention not only to its own interests but also to the interest of the employees.
More specifically, it may not undermine the status of the Union as sole bargaining agent of the employees by unreasonably narrowing the scope of the
bargaining unit. This is an obligation fairly implied in the "recognition
clause." Republic Steel Corp., 32 Lab. Arb. 799, 803-04 (1959) (Platt,
Arbitrator).
The present Referee, while rejecting the Union's view that there exists
an absolute (implied) prohibition on the contracting out of work of kinds
regularly and normally performed by bargaining unit employees, likewise
rejects the Company's view that it has complete freedom in this respect. In
the Springfield case he indicated that "a standard of 'good faith' may be
applicable, difficult of definition as this may be." Upon further reflection,
he is prepared now to say that he thinks this standard is implicit in the unionmanagement relationship represented by the parties' Agreement, in view of
the quite legitimate interests and expectations which the employees and the
Union have in protecting the fruits of their negotiations with the Company ....
Real difficulty arises, however, in attempting to lay down a set of specific
criteria to be used in determining whether, in a subcontracting situation, an
employer has acted in bad faith. Many arbitrators have sought to do this,
and the wide variation in the results of their deliberations of itself casts some
doubt upon the wisdom of such efforts and suggests that detailed specification may best be left to the collective bargaining process. In general, it
seems to the Referee that "good faith" is present when the managerial decision to contract out work is made on the basis of a rational consideration
of factors related to the conduct of an efficient, economical operation, and
with some regard for the interests and expectations of the employees affected
by the decision, and that "bad faith" is present when the decision is arbitrary
(i.e., lacks any rational basis) or fails to take into account at all the interests
and expectations of employees affected. . . . Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 39
Lab. Arb. 1213, 1218-19 (1962) (Smith, Arbitrator).
If there is no special evidence of intent one way or the other, the arbitrator
must ask himself whether constructive intent should be assigned to the parties. Constructive intent is concededly a legal fiction but is sometimes an
essential element of statutory as well as contractual interpretation. The
arbitrator must consider whether an implied obligation should be extracted
from the various articles of the agreement which have been negotiated for
the benefit of the employees and the protection of the union. Such an im-
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reviewing and rejecting the extreme positions on the issue of implied
contractual limitations on subcontracting, he then proceeded to
note "that there are vital concerns underlying each of these extreme
viewpoints."' 44 These were identified as being, on the union side,
the "stake . . . in maintaining its representational integrity and
employee job security"45 and, on the employer side, the "stake...
in its power to manage an efficient business., 41 His analysis then
proceeded as follows:
Ultimately the question in this case as in any case entails
weighing the Company's affirmative case for the particular decision to subcontract against the impact that decision has upon the
subject matter of the bargain. The integrity of the bargain protected by the very execution of the contract, the recognition, wage
and related dauses, may be said to have47 been violated where the
balance favors the Union; otherwise not.
He then concluded that in the case before him "the balance appears
... quite dearly to favor the Company." He noted among other
things the "episodic and temporary" nature of the particular subcontracting, the "extremely small" impact upon the bargaining unit,
and the company's "wholly plausible business reasons to farm out
the work complained of which do not remotely suggest either taking
advantage of a contractor's lesser wage scale ('beating the -union
prices',...) or a motive to reduce the status of the Union."4' 8
One of the problems in the attempt to extract from the decisions the meaning and import of the good faith criterion, where
it is determined that this is the test to be applied, is that it is not
dear to what extent a different criterion mentioned in the arbitrator's opinion (and therefore listed as a separate factor in the
plied obligation is often called the "covenant of good faith and fair dealing."
It is implied in every contract that neither party will take any action which
improperly impairs or destroys the right of the other party to receive the
fruits of the bargain. In deciding whether the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing has been violated, one must examine the employer's motive in
taking action which adversely affects the employees. Objective effects as
well as subjective purposes must be scrutinized, in order to ascertain whether
the economic interests of the employees were so disproportionately impaired
as to destroy the substance of the agreement for all practical purposes. Another test is whether the employer's action was in accordance with conventional and customary business practice. Safeway Stores, Inc., 42 Lab. Arb.
353, 357 (1964) (Ross, Arbitrator).
4340 Lab. Arb. 737 (1963) (Kadish, O'Bea, and Southon, Arbitrators).
44
Id. at 740.
45

Ibid.

46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
4
8 Id. at

741.
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survey tabulations) is simply overlapping or is regarded as independently significant. Might an arbitrator take the position in a
given case that while the employer acted in good faith, a protested
act of subcontracting nevertheless was violative of the contract on
the ground, for example, that it was inconsistent with past practice
or had a substantial, adverse impact on the scope of the bargaining
unit or detrimentally affected employment opportunities of bargaining unit employees? The difficulty here arises in part out of the
conceptual problem involved in attempting to establish the rationale
for deriving from the labor agreement an implicit limitation on
the right to contract out. For example, the view that good faith
requires the employer to refrain from any act which will deprive
the union and the represented employees of the benefits of the
agreement would lead naturally to a rather rigorous and pervasive
kind of implied limitation. If, on the other hand, this fruits of
the bargain concept is rejected in favor of a concept of good faith
which relates more to subjective intent than to objective effects,
the implied limitation on management becomes less severe. Those
qualifications or criteria identified as Items 1 through 5 in Tables
I and II are related to this kind of analysis.
(3) Deprivation of Work from BargainingUnit Employees.One factor noted in each of the survey analyses as having been
mentioned with considerable frequency is whether the particular
act of subcontracting actually deprived any substantial number of
bargaining unit employees of work. It is perhaps significant that
in most of the cases in which this factor was mentioned, and in
which the grievance was denied, the arbitrator also mentioned good
faith as a factor, which may mean that the absence of a direct,
adverse impact on employment opportunities is taken to be one of
the indications of good faith. In a fair number of the relatively
few cases in which the grievance was sustained, the arbitrator
noted that there had been a direct, adverse impact upon employment.
(4) Past Practice. - In the current survey, thirty arbitrators
mentioned past practice as a factor considered. The apparent
importance of this factor, at least as indicated by the frequency with
which it was noted in the opinion, appeared also in the Dash and
Greenbaum surveys. In each of the three surveys this factor was
noted in a substantial number of cases in which the grievance
was denied, and in a few cases in which the grievance was sustained. The relevance of an established past practice, particu-
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larly if it has extended over a period of years during which there
have been successive contract negotiations, seems fairly clear however the basic contractual issue is framed. Obviously, consistency or
inconsistency with such practice has some relation to the matter of
good faith and some bearing on the determination of an issue expressed in terms of the parties' mutual agreement or understanding
concerning the existence and scope of any implied restriction.
(5) Collective BargainingHistory.-Related, of course, is factor twelve which was listed separately in the author's survey,
namely, "collective bargaining history" on the subject of subcontracting. This factor has been cited either alone or along with
past practice in a substantial number of cases in which the grievance has been denied. It seems fairly obvious that an established
past practice of subcontracting in circumstances not substantially
different from those in the particular case under protest, together
with a history of unsuccessful union efforts to obtain contractual
restrictions, presents an intrinsically weaker case for the union than
if the facts show the presence of one factor but not the other. It is
probable, moreover, that arbitrators would be more likely to be
persuaded by past practice than by collective bargaining history.
This kind of reaction seems quite justified. An attempt, or even
a series of attempts, on either side to write restrictions or rights into
a collective bargaining agreement ought not to be regarded, standing alone, as evidence of a mutual understanding that, unless the
specific provision were inserted, the labor agreement would have
to be interpreted, as to the matter in question, adversely to the
position taken by the proponent of the amendment. This would
not be true, of course, if the agreement contained an express provision which the proposed amendment was designed to modify.
Certainly it is perfectly sound and healthy collective bargaining
practice in dealing with the area of reserved rights or implied
limitations for one side or the other to attempt to buttress its view
of a basic contractual position by writing in an explicit provision.
(6) Miscellaneous Factors.-There is no reason to discuss in
any detail factors six through eleven of the Dash-Greenbaum analyses. Items six through ten simply identify various of the standard provisions of the labor agreement which, arguably, either
singly or in combination give rise to some sort of implied limitation
on the right to contract out bargaining unit work. Unless one
were to accept the notion that one or more of these provisions
necessarily implies an absolute prohibition on subcontracting, as
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the Seventh Circuit held in UA W v. Webster Elec. Co., 9 their citation, or any particular reference to them in an arbitrator's opinion, adds
nothing to the analysis. Factor eleven - whether the protested
act constituted an attempt to evade some substantive provision of
the agreement or would be in violation of its spirit, intent, or purpose - was a formulation appearing with some frequency in the
Dash analysis, with considerably less frequency in the Greenbaum
analysis, and almost not at all in the author's survey. It scarcely
needs to be articulated as a separate, identifiable consideration if,
as now seems generally to be agreed, the matter of good faith is
the basic point to be investigated.
Factor thirteen extends to cases in which the union posited its
claim of implied limitation by specifically citing the recognition,
seniority, wage, and similar provisions of the particular agreement.
It was included in the survey only to show that it is this kind of
argument, as distinguished from some other articulated theory such
as that of good faith, which is generally the contractual, basis of
the claim of implied limitation. In addition, the factor demonstrates the point, already obvious from the tabulations, that it normally does not suffice merely to persuade the arbitrator of the merits
of the grievance. Therefore, arbitration experience suggests that
the union's chances of success will be more directly related to the
extent to which it can make solid factual arguments related to one
or more of the first five factors listed in the surveys.
D. Results of the Silent Agreement Decisions
It has already been noted that the union "batting average" in
the cases covered by the several surveys has not been impressive.
In only twelve instances in the current survey did the union succeed in persuading the arbitrator to sustain the grievance on the
merits. An examination of these cases further indicates that the
record is even less impressive than might at first appear. In two
of the cases back pay was not awarded despite the finding of violation of an implied limitation, because, as the arbitrator viewed the
matter, the employer had thought he was acting in good faith and
had made immediate effort to correct the situation. In three other
cases, in which the arbitrator heard multiple grievances protesting
subcontracting, the ratio of union success was, respectively, one in
49 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1962).
The court relied primarily upon the "union
shop" provision in the labor agreement.
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ten, one in three, and one in two. In each of the instances in which
the grievance was sustained, the case, as compared with the others
in which the grievance was denied, involved the least amount of
work subcontracted in terms of employees, time, and money. In
two of the twelve cases the sole basis of the decision was the conclusion that the recognition provision of the agreement precluded
any subcontracting, a point of view which certainly is without
general support. In one case the arbitrator seemed to base his conclusion on a finding of anti-union bias.
Taking the twelve cases as a whole, and disregarding those in
which the arbitrator derived an absolute prohibition from the recognition clause, three considerations seem to have been regarded as
the most important. In six cases the arbitrator seemed to be influenced by the fact that regular bargaining unit work was involved.
In four cases the existence of available unit personnel, together with
equipment and other facilities, was deemed significant. In four
cases the adverse effect on the employees was cited as important. On
the other hand, all three analyses show that these same considerations have been present in a number of cases in which the grievances have been denied on their merits. One can only conclude
that the "fog" which Arbitrator Crawford detected as blanketing the
area of decision-making has not been noticeably pierced in recent
years by any kind of arbitral radar.
III. SURVEY OF RECENT ARBITRATION
DECISIONS CONCERNING SUBCONTRACTING
UNDER AGREEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT SILENT

Neither the Dash nor the Greenbaum surveys attempted to
cover arbitration decisions presenting problems of interpretation or
application of contractual provisions explicitly restricting subcontracting - the non-silent contract. Crawford likewise dealt only
briefly with this area, but he did categorize types of contract provisions into four groups as follows:
(1) The weakest limitation on contracting out is the "discussion before contracting out" type clause. "The Company shall
inform the Union of any construction or repair work or bargaining
unit work, to be contracted out prior to the writing of the contract, and discuss it with the Union."
(2) The strongest prohibition against contracting out is found
in this type of clause. "There shall be no regular work performed
by any employee not covered by the contract except in emergencies
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or when work must be performed for which regular employees are
not qualified." Here the probability of a lay-off or demotion as a
consequence of the subcontracting is not required. Nor is there
any provision for differences in the managerial problem or managerial know-how.
(3) More common is the limitation of reasonableness. 'Trhe
Company will make every reasonable effort to use its available
working force and equipment in order to avoid having its work
performed by outside contractors"; or "The Company will use its
own employees whenever possible."
(4) Finally, the most common clause is the prohibition against
contracting out unit work when the firm's own employees are on
layoff, or when the layoff or demotion of unit employees would
result. "The company will not contract work which would require
employees in the bargaining unit to be laid off or reduced in rate
of pay, or would prevent re-employment of employees laid-off not
longer than one year." 50
It was decided that the author's survey of the more recent ar-

bitration decisions should include cases in which problems of interpretation and application of specific contractual restrictions on
subcontracting have been presented.51 It would seem to be of some
interest to determine to what extent Crawford's categorization continues to be appropriate, in so far as can be judged from the sampling
of contract provisions reflected in the reported decisions. In addidon, it might be useful to compare restrictive criteria agreed upon
in collective bargaining negotiations with those which have
emerged in the arbitral process in cases involving silent contracts.
A total of 47 cases have been examined including a few that have
not been published. The results are shown in Tables III and IV.
The analysis indicates that the Crawford categorization of contract provisions continues to be generally accurate except that a fifth
category should be added in which the contract prohibits the subcontracting of work "normally," "customarily," or "regularly" performed by unit employees; or limits subcontracting to "major"
maintenance or repairs or to "new" construction, operations, facilities or work; or specifies certain "standards" or "criteria" to be
met as prerequisites, such as that it must be justifiable on grounds of
practicality, economy, efficiency, or business considerations; or
limits subcontracting to particular types of work or to instances

5o CRAWFORD, op. cit. supra note 17, at 52.

51 The collection of cases was made by Research Assistant Sydney Frank. The
classification of them in the tabulations which follow was done by Research Assistant
Renato L. Cayetano. To each of these the author wishes to express his indebtedness.
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TABLE M
CASES GROUPED BY CATEGORIES
Category (1) "DisasionBefore Contracting Ou" Type
Company Name
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Co.
'Detroit Edison Co.
International Paper Co.
'0. Hommel Co.
*Huron Portland Cement Co.
*Hofmann Indus.
Givaudan Corp.
*Reynolds Metals Co.

Thc Hamm flrcwing Co,
*Joseph T. Ryerson & Son,
Inc.
Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.
*Mason & Hanger-Silas
Mason Co.
'Meshberger Stone Corp.
'Monsanto Chem. Co.
Lee Rubber & Tire Co.
'Crane Co, Chapman Div.

'Celetex Corp.
*Tenneco Oil Co.

Arbitrator

Ci.aion
43 Lab. Arb.
43 Lab. AMb.

307 (1964)
193 (1964)

39 Lab. Arb. 747 (1962)
45 Lab. Arb. 999 (1965)

Added pators
Or Suppota

P. M. Hebert
R. A. Smith

1,3,4,5
1,2,4

L Hawley

3
None"

B. N. Reid
R. W. Haughton

Unp ubL
Category (2) "Strongest Prohibitionr'Type
L M. Gill
pubL
I.B. Scheiber
LubL
Un
A. L Coffey
333
(1963)
Lab.
Arb.
42

None
None

4,6
None

J, 5, William

None

42 Lab. Arb. 1196 (1964)
42 Lab. AMb. 931 (1964)

M. Rubin
L Bernstein

None
None

42 Lab. Mrb. 1247 (1964)
41 ab. AMb. 137 (1963)
40 Lab. Arb. 177 (1963)
Unpubl.

G. S. King
J. J. Willingham
M. M. Rohman
S. Wallen

8
None
None
None

42 Lab, Arb,

42
41
40
39
44
39
44

ab.
Lab.
Lab.
Lab.
lab.
lab.
ab.

83 (1963)

Category (3) "Reasonableness" Type
J. V. Altieri
Mrb. 781 (1963)
J.W.Sweeney
Ab. 464 (1963)
J. W.Sweeney
Ab. 240 (1963)
H. Wissner
Ab. 282 (1962)
M.Merrill
Ab. 1121 (1965)
J. Shister
Arb. 937 (1962)
F. Uible
Ab. 473 (1965)

'Tenneco Oil Co.
*Tenneco Oil Co.
Niagra Weldments, Inc.
'Owens-Coming Fiberglass
Corp.
*Whirlpool Corp.

44 Lab. Arb. 876 (1965)

OR. D. Warner Co.
'Kyova Fiber Pipe Co.
'Ohio Valley Gas Co.
'Thriftimart, Inc
Ed Friedrich, Inc.

Category (4) "NoImpairnent of Employment" Type
C. V. Duff
UnpubL
S. L Chalfie
UnpubL
S.S. Kates
44 lab. Arb. 786 (1964)
F. Meyers
40 Lab. Ab. 449 (1963)
J.S. Williams
39 ab. Arb. 399 (1962)

H. Cole

None
2,7
9
1,6
None
None

7
None
None
None
1,2
None
9

Category (5) "Criteri" Type

Mitchell Specialty Div,
Novo Indus. Corp.
*National Gypsum Co.
Wilshire Oil Co.
Meadow Gold Prods. Corp.
Publicker Indus, Inc.
Phillips Chem. Co.
Columbus & So. Ohio Elec.
Co.
Ideal Cement Co.
Ostrow Enterprises Co.
Merck Sharp & Dohme
Merck Sharp & Dohme
United States Steel Corp.
United States Steel Corp.
Lynch Corp.
Consolidated Foods Corp.

Unpubl.
43 lab. Arb.
42 Lab. Arb.

42 Lab. AMb.
42 Lab. Mrb.
41 lab. Arb.

(1964)
(1964)
(1964)

L M. Gill
L. Autrey
T. T. Roberts
S. L Cahn

(1964)
(1963)

D. A. Crawford
C. R. Schedler

41 Lab. Ab. 1225 (1963)

39 lab. Arb. 349 (1962)
44
44
44
44

lab. Ab.
Lab. Ab.
Lab. rb.
Lab. Arb.

242
262
793
321

(1965)
(1965)
(1965)
(1965)

44 Lab. Ab. 317 (1965)
44 ab. Arb. 762 (1964)
45 Lab. Ab. 331 (1965)

V. L Stouffer

H. Wissner
P. Prascow
W. Loucks

D. Crawford
C. McDermott
S. Garrett
H. Dworkin
R. Gibson

None

3,5,8
1,2
None
None
3,4
None
1
7
None
8
5,6,8
4, 5, 6
None

6,7

"Denotes that clause might possibly belong also in another category or categories.
"None" denotes that the arbitrator, in denying or sustaining the grievance, has relied exclusively
and primarily on the language of the contract (as applied or interpreted by him).
t Denotes that the grievance was denied on the merits.
t-tDenotes that the grievance was sustained on the merits.
" -tDenotes that the grievance was in part sustained and in part denied on the merits.
Legend: "Added Factors or Support" refers to factors, support, or considerations used by the arbitrator aside from, or in addition to, those dearly flowing from the express contractual provi.
sion on subcontracting.
Added Factorsor Support
Number
1. Established past practices of subcontracting our without prior notice to, or negotiation with, the union; also subcontracting not different in kind or degree from
past practices.
2. History of bargaining negotiations indicates that the union had unsuccessfully attempted to limit or prohibit the company from unilateral subcontracting
Ceither broad or specific limitations).
3. No "significant impairment on the emloyren; job tenure, security rights or

Numbel
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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

1298

TABLE IV
CASES IN WHICH CONTRACT PROVISION APPLIED WITHC
RELIANCE ON OTHER "SUPPORT' FACTORS
Company Name

Contractual Criteria
Applied/Interpreted

Citation

0. Hommel Co.
Huron Portland Cement Co.
Hofmann Indus., Inc.
Reynolds Metals Co.
Theo Hamm Brewing Co.
Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.
Joseph T. Ryerson & Son,
Inc.
Meshberger Stone Corp.
Monsanto Chem. Co.
Lee Rubber & Tire Co.
Crane Co, Chapman Div.
Tenneco Oil Co.
Niagra Weldments, Inc.
Whirlpool Corp.
R. D. Warner Co.
Kyova Fiber Pipe Co.
Thriftimart, Inc.
Novo Indus. Corp.
Meadow Gold Prods. Corp.
Publicker Indus., Inc.
Columbus & So. Ohio
Elec. Co.
Merck Sharp & Dohme
Lynch Corp.

45 Lab.
Unpubl.
Unpubl.
42 Lab.
42 Lab.
42 Lab.

Arb. 999 (1965)

1
1,2

Arb. 333 (1963)
Arb. 83 (1963)
Arb. 931 (1964)

6
4
4

1, 6

42 Lab. Arb.
41 Lab. Arb.
40 Lab. Arb.
Unpubl.
42 Lab. Arb.
44 Lab. Arb.
39 Lab. Arb.
44 Lab. Arb.
Unpubl.
Unpubl.
40 Lab. Arb.
Unpubl.
42 Lab. Arb.
42 Lab. Arb.

1196 (1964)
137 (1963)
177 (1963)

4,2
4,5
4,6

4,6
781
1121
937
786

(1963)
(1965)
(1962)
(1965)

449 (1963)
466 (1964)
598 (1964)

41 Lab. Arb. 1225 (1963)
44 Lab. Arb. 262 (1965)
44 Lab. Arb. 762 (1964)

3,7
6,7
6
2

2,7
2,7
2, 5,7
7,8
2, 8
1
7
2
9

Legend: "Contractual Criteria Applied or Interpreted" means the fulfillment or nonfulfillment
a contractual "standard" or "requirement", or the existence of a fact, event, or occasion i
posed by the contract as a condition on subcontracting.
Number

Contractual CriteriaApplied/Interpreted

1. Subcontracting permitted with respect to "new" work, services, or the like; or
"major" repairs, construction, installations, work, or services.
2. Subcontracting prohibited with regard to work or services "customarily," "reg
larly," or "normally" performed by the company on its premises by its ov
unit employees.
3. Subcontracting permitted in cases where "economical," "practical," or during "ui
usual" or "emergency" circumstances (with or without provision for advani
notice or discussion).
4. Subcontracting specifically prohibited with respect to certain types of work 4
services as expressly noted in the agreement.
5. Subcontracting prohibited unless contractor or successor-employer agrees to ol
serve the terms and conditions of the agreement; or agrees to pay equal
higher wages.
6. Subcontracting prohibited unless qualified and skilled employees and/or adequa
plant equipment are not available.
7. Subcontracting prohibited when there are unit employees on layoff status; or wh(
subcontracting would result in layoff or displacement or unit employees; (
when subcontracting would result in reduction of work week, hours of wor]
or wages.
8. Subcontracting prohibited when "competition is reasonably equal"; or when woi
is not "customarily" performed "outside" the plant.
9. Subcontacting prohibited unless "schedules cannot be met after utilization of qual

1966]

SUBCONTRACTING

1299

where there is a "lack of available equipment or skilled employees.""2
52

In examining the cases some of the contract provisions involved, which seem to
fall into some one of the five categories, were selected for illustration.
Category (1) ("Discussion before contracting" type)
"When consideration is being given to contracting work out thorough discussion will take place with the appropriate union representatives." Kaiser Aluminum and Chem. Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 307 (1964) (Herbert, Arbitrator).
"Outside Contractors. (a) If management proposes to contract out work
which is regularly and customarily done by the employees in a bargaining
unit, and such contracting appears to threaten their security of employment,
the chairman or chief steward of the division will be given prior notice
thereof." Detroit Edison Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 193 (1964) (Smith, Arbitrator).
"New works and major repairs to building including painting may be contracted out. The Company agrees to discuss this with the Union." 0.
Hommel Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 999 (1965) (Reid, Arbitrator). (This provision could also be included in categories (3) and (5)).
Category (2) ("Strongest prohibition" type)
"All work coming within the jurisdiction of the IAM and so recognized shall
be performed by employees covered by this contract; such as .... The Hamm
Brewing Co., 42 Lab. Arb. (1963) (Williams, Arbitrator).
"Non-bargaining unit employees shall not be permitted to perform work
customarily performed by the production and maintenance employees covered by services or for training purposes or in cases of emergency." Joseph
T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 42 Lab. Arb. 1196 (1964) (Rubin, Arbitrator).
(Also suitable for category (5)).
"The Company agrees that types of work, assigned to Mason-and-Hanger-Silas
Mason Company, at Clarksville Facility, which are normally performed by
the Bargaining Unit is recognized as coming within the jurisdiction of the
I.A.M. and is covered by this Agreement, and will be performed by the employees covered by this Agreement." Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 42
Lab. Arb. 1247 (1964) (King, Arbitrator). (Also suitable for category
(5)).
Category (3) ("Reasonableness" type)
"Article 10(2). Except in cases where delivery dates may be placed in jeopardy, the Company will use every effort to avoid subcontracting of work so
long as any employee is on layoff, or the employees in the unit are on a reduced work week schedule." Crane Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 781 (1963) (Altieri,
Arbitrator). (Also suitable for category (4)).
"The Corporation will make every reasonable effort to use its available
working forces and equipment in order to avoid having its work performed
by outside contractors. The Corporation will not contract work which would
require employees in the Bargaining Unit to be laid off, reduced in rate of
pay, or prevent qualified employees from being upgraded, or prevent laidoff employees from being recalled." Tenneco Oil Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 240
(1963) (Sweeney, Arbitrator).
(This provision could appropriately also
be included in category (4) ). See also other cases involving this provision,
Tenneco Oil Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 282 (1962) (Wissner, Arbitrator; Tenneco
Oil Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 1121 (1965) (Merrill, Arbitrator).
"Work shall not be contracted for which the Company concludes that it has
qualified employees and adequate equipment." Niagra Weldments, Inc., 39
Lab. Arb. 937 (1962) (Shister, Arbitrator).
Category (4) ("No impairment of employment" type)
"The Company agrees that it will not contract any work which is ordinarily
and customarily done by its regular employees if as a result thereof, it would
become necessary to lay off any such employees, or any such employees are
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It is obvious that the inclusion of a contract provision on
subcontracting did not, in the cases examined, resolve all problems; otherwise, recourse to arbitration would have been unnecessary. Quite obviously, the contractual standard was unclear, at
least to the parties, in its application to the fact situations presented.
The distinct impression was gained, upon examining the opinions
-in the cases, that in many instances the arbitrator seemed to introduce considerations in support of his conclusion not necessarily
involved in a strict interpretation of the particular contract restriction on subcontracting.
The analysis represented by the foregoing tabulations yields
some rather interesting information. Twenty decisions of the 43
examined, constituting approximately 45 per cent of the total,
were cases in which the analyst concluded that the arbitrator relied
upon, or at least mentioned in support of his conclusion, factors or
considerations not strictly called for by the particular contract provision. Understandably, this occurred least frequently in the case
laid off because of lack of work." Ohio Valley Gas. Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 786
(1964) (Kates, Arbitrator). (Also suitable for category (5)).
"The Company will not contract out work which would require employees
in the bargaining unit to be laid off or reduced in rate of pay or to prevent
re-employment of employees laid off or to keep from paying overtime to the
employees who would normally perform the work." Ed Friedrich, Inc., 39
Lab. Arb. 399 (1962) (Williams, Arbitrator).
"It is the intent of the parties to this agreement that the wages, hours, working conditions and fringe benefits embodied herein, which have been arrived
at through the years of collective bargaining shall be preserved and maintained. It is also the intent of the parties that work presently being performed by employees covered by this agreement will not be contracted out in
order to displace present employees. In this regard, industry practices
'shall not be changed'." Thriftimart, Inc., 40 Lab. Arb. 449 (1963) (Meyers,
Arbitrator).
Category (5) ("Criteria" type)
"The Company agrees not to contract out work customarily performed by
its employees. However, nothing herein contained shall prevent the Company
from continuing to have work performed outside the Company which prior
to April 30, 1962, it customarily has had performed outside the Company."
Meadow Gold Prods. Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 466 (1964) (Cahn, Arbitrator).
"All new construction, new machinery installations, new equipment installations and work pertinent thereto, and major repair works may be given to
outside contractors to perform." Publicker Indus., Inc., 42 Lab. Arb. 598
(1964) (Crawford, Arbitrator). "It is agreed that work shall be performed
as much as practicable by Union labor in the Employer's own shop. In
the event that all work cannot be rendered in the Shop of the Employer, the
Employer may contract his work to union shops only." Ostrow Enterprises,
Inc., 44 Lab. Arb. 242 (1965) (Prascow, Arbitrator).
"The Company recognizes the employees ... shall perform all mechanical or
other work incident to the maintenance of plant that is done on plant premises provided the necessary plant equipment is available and skills of present
employees can be utilized." National Gypsum Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 842 (1964)
(Autrey, Arbitrator).
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of the contract provisions in the second category ("strongest prohibition" type). The supportive factors cited bear a marked resemblance to those often mentioned by arbitrators in deciding subcontracting issues presented under the silent contract. Moreover,
the won-loss figures for the cases involving non-silent contracts
suggest, if the sample is at all representative, that the union prospects of success are not substantial, although they are (again understandably) somewhat better than if the agreement is silent on
subcontracting. As could have been anticipated, the chances of a
favorable decision appear to vary directly with the specificity of the
contract provision in establishing a restriction on the managerial
right to subcontract.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Subcontracting of bargaining unit work has presented a complex of problems both under the law of the NLRA and the law
of the collective bargaining agreement. Included are the problems of overlapping jurisdiction between the forum for enforcing
the law and the forums for enforcing the agreement, particularly,
as to the latter, the arbitration process. Despite the basic differences between the statutory issues involved before the NLRB and
the contractual issues presented in arbitration, the decisions seem to
take account, increasingly, of the same kinds of factors when the
problem raised is in the context of the silent labor agreement.
As to each branch of the decision-making process there is difficulty
in the prediction of the result and of conceptualization.
Unions have not, on the whole, fared well in attempting to
obtain restrictions on subcontracting through the arbitration process
where the agreement has been silent on the subject. Nor have
they come off distinctly better when the agreement has contained
an express contractual provision except where the provision has
been explicit rather than cast in terms of general criteria.

